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ABSTRACT
This  paper  develops  a  game-theoretic  model  that  predicts  when  a  university  invention  is
commercialized in a start-up firm rather than an established firm.  The model predicts that university
inventions are more likely to occur in start-ups when the technology transfer officer’s (TTO’s) search
cost is high, the cost of development or commercialization is lower for a start-up, or the inventor’s
effort cost in development is lower in a start-up.  We test the theory using data from the Association
of University Technology Managers, the National Research Council, and the National Venture
Capital  Association.    Licensing  is  more  likely  in  general,  and  especially  so  in  start-ups,  by
universities in states with larger levels of venture capital.  TTO size has no effect on start-ups, but
does increase licences.  Conversely, universities that earn greater licensing royalties have fewer start-
ups but more licenses.  The number of start-ups is decreasing in the interest rate, increasing in the
S&P 500, and unaffected by the levels of industrial research funding and the presence of a medical
school.  All of these results are consistent with the predictions of our theory.
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The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 led to an explosion in the growth of technol-
ogy transfer oﬃces in U.S. universities, as well as a substantial increase in
the commercialization of university inventions and resulting revenue. Gross
license royalties paid to universities in the Association of University Tech-
nology Managers (AUTM) annual surveys for 1993 through 2002 increased
by a remarkable 284%, from roughly $238 million to $915 million. The com-
mercialization of university inventions was dominated by established ﬁrms
during this period. On average, each surveyed university annually licensed
25 inventions to established ﬁrms, but only 3 inventions to start-up ﬁrms.
This ratio has been reasonably constant during this period as well. AUTM
data show that the number of licenses executed with established ﬁrms grew
by 90%, while the number of licenses with start-ups grew by 105%. Given
the embryonic nature of most university inventions, it is somewhat surpris-
ing that there has not more commercialization via start-ups. This paper
develops and empirically tests a theory that attempts to explain this by ex-
amining reasons for the commercialization of university inventions through
start-up ﬁrms as opposed to established ﬁrms.
Technology transfer oﬃcers (TTOs) are responsible for making good-
faith eﬀorts to commercialize university inventions. This process begins
when a faculty member discloses a potential invention to the TTO, who
then tries to ﬁnd a partner for commercialization. Typically, if the TTO is
unable to ﬁnd an established ﬁrm willing to acquire a license for this new
technology, then it shelves the invention. That is, the TTO returns it to the
inventor, who may then seek venture capitalists or angel investors to help
fund a start-up ﬁrm in order to attempt to commercialize the invention.
In fact, the TTO may even return it to the inventor immediately, without
even trying to ﬁnd an established ﬁrm to license it. In this event, the
T T Om a ya s s i s tt h ei n v e n t o ri ns e a r c h i n gf o ra ni n v e s t o rt of u n das t a r t - u p ,
but typically TTOs focus their eﬀorts on licensing inventions to established
ﬁrms.
We formalize this by developing a game-theoretic model of university
licensing. The model provides two key implications regarding commercial-
ization by start-up ﬁrms rather than established ﬁrms. First, if the TTO’s
utility cost of searching is the same for both types of ﬁrms, then start-ups
occur in equilibrium only if a start-up ﬁrm earns greater expected proﬁt,
gross of any license payments, than an established ﬁrm, so that the TTO
can earn greater net utility from licensing to a start-up under the optimal
contract. This occurs if a start-up ﬁrm has a cost advantage in additional de-
2velopment or commercialization. For example, venture capitalists routinely
deal with new products and processes, so they may well have better access to
and/or information about the expertise needed to develop and commercial-
ize embryonic inventions, which would provide a start-up ﬁrm with a cost
advantage. Similarly, inventor-founded start-ups may well have cost advan-
tages due to the inventor’s superior knowledge of the technology, which can
limit transactional and informational problems (Shane 2002). Also, if there
is a lower opportunity cost of development eﬀort for either the inventor or
ﬁrm in a start-up, then either may provide greater eﬀort in the development
stage, which results in a higher probability of success and greater expected
proﬁt for the start-up. The second main implication is that licensing to a
s t a r t - u pc a no c c u r ,e v e ni fe x p e c t e dp r o ﬁt is the same for both types of ﬁrms,
simply because the TTO’s opportunity cost of searching for an established
ﬁrm as a licensee is greater. This occurs, for example, if the TTO has a
large pool of higher-quality disclosures available, so less attractive ones are
immediately shelved.
We summarize the empirical implications of the theory in terms of char-
acteristics of the inventor, the TTO, and the invention, and ﬁnancial market
conditions. Our empirical analysis uses data from the AUTM surveys for
1993-2002, the 1993 National Research Council’s Survey of Ph.D. Granting
Institutions, and the National Venture Capital Association Yearbook 2004.
We estimate models for the number of licenses to start-ups and the number
of licenses (and options) to established ﬁrms per university in each year. In
general, like Di Gregoriao and Shane (2003), our results provide evidence
that universities with higher quality faculty are more likely to license their
inventions to either start-ups or established ﬁrms. More importantly, we
ﬁnd that the quality of the university’s engineering faculty, rather than that
of the science faculty or the entire faculty, is the most signiﬁcant inﬂuence
on the number of licenses.
We ﬁnd support that the Bayh-Dole Act has been eﬀective in the sense
that TTOs have signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced university licensing. Our result show
that both the age of the TTO and the number of disclosures made to the
TTO had positive and signiﬁcant impacts on licensing to either start-ups or
established ﬁrms. Gross license royalties also had a positive and signiﬁcant
impact on licensing to established ﬁrms, but not start-ups. Somewhat sur-
prisingly, the size of the TTO did not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on licensing
to either type of ﬁrm.
Finally, our results also provide evidence that ﬁnancial market conditions
matter for licensing via start-ups. We ﬁnds that both the rate of return to
v e n t u r ec a p i t a la n dt h ei n t e r e s tr a t eh a v en e g a t i v ea n ds i g n i ﬁcant eﬀects
3on the number of university start-ups, but general market conditions, as
measured by the S&P 500, have a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on start-ups.
Thus, our analysis indicates that one answer to the question of why there
are not more university start-ups is that university inventions are not just
embryonic, but very embryonic. If an established ﬁrm is unwilling to take
al i c e n s e ,t h e ni ti sv e r yd i ﬃcult to ﬁnd the funding for a start-up because
even the venture capitalists who specialize in start-ups come to university
inventions only as a last resort, when the returns to venture capital elsewhere
are very low.
2 Literature Review
Our results contribute to the growing theoretical literature on the licens-
ing of university inventions, which has predominantly focused on the eﬀects
of the Bayh-Dole Act, and the behavior of inventors and TTOs: Jensen
and Thursby (2001), Lach and Shankerman (2002), Jensen, Thursby, and
Thursby (2003), Thursby, Thursby, and Decheneaux (2004), Hoppe and Oz-
denoren (2004), Macho-Stadler, Perez-Castrillo, and Veugelers (2004), and
Hellmann (2005). One exception to this is Jensen and Thursby (2004), who
study the eﬀects of increased incentives to commercialize university research
on the trade-oﬀ between applied and basic research, and the quality of edu-
cation. What distinguishes our theoretical model is that all previous eﬀorts
have simply focused on the licensing or commercializing of the invention to
some ﬁrm, rather than determining the conditions under which commercial-
ization occurs through a start-up ﬁrm instead of an established ﬁrm.
Our results also contribute to the now extensive empirical literature on
the commercialization of university research and start-ups. Much of the lit-
erature on university invention has abstracted from examining the role of
university inventors and TTOs. Exceptions include Bercovitz et al. (2001)
and Siegel et al. (1999), who take an organizational perspective, Thursby
et al. (2001), Thursby and Thursby (2001), Jensen, Thursby, and Thursby
(2003), and Thursby, Thursby, and Decheneaux (2004), who examine the
role of TTOs in structuring license contracts, and Lach and Shankerman
(2002), who study the number and value of inventor disclosures. Our work
adds to this literature by analyzing the eﬀe c to fb o t ht h eq u a l i t yo ff a c u l t y
and the historical success of the TTO on the choice between commercializa-
tion by established ﬁrms and start-ups.
Shane has examined factors inﬂuencing the performance of start-ups us-
ing data on inventions by MIT faculty. He shows that the formation of
4start-ups is fostered by both recognition of business opportunities by inven-
tors (Shane 2000) and the presence of technological opportunities (Shane
2001). Shane and Stuart (2002) ﬁnd that start-ups are more likely to suc-
ceed if the founders have relationships with venture capitalists. Di Gregoriao
and Shane (2003) examine start-up formation across US universities, using
AUTM data for the period 1994-1998, and ﬁnd a positive relationship be-
tween start-up formation and faculty quality, as measured by the Gourman
Report. Our empirical analysis, in part, updates and extends this study. The
latter two studies include ﬁnancial market factors in the form of availability
of nearby sources of venture capital and IPOs, but do not examine more
general measures of ﬁnancial market activity, or measures of TTO experi-
ence. Finally, Shane (2002) compares MIT inventions licensed to established
and start-up ﬁrms. He ﬁnds that licensing to inventor-founded start-ups is
more likely when patents are ineﬀective at preventing information problems
(such as moral hazard and adverse selection), because the inventor’s su-
perior knowledge of the technology precludes such problems in start-ups.
However, he also ﬁnds that licenses to start-ups perform poorly compared
to licenses to established ﬁrms, and concludes that licensing to start-ups on
a second best solution for TTOs. This supports our assumption that TTOs
generally prefer to license to established ﬁrms, and put far less eﬀort into
searching for start-up licensees. Similarly, Lowe and Ziedonis (2004) com-
pare the outcomes of licenses to start-ups with those to established ﬁrms
using data from the University of California and ﬁnd that royalties from
start-ups are higher, on average, but successful commercialization tends to
occur only after acquisition by an established ﬁrm.
Other recent literature has examined start-up ﬁrm activity and licensing
in general. Shane and Somaya (2004) use AUTM data and patent litigation
data during 1991-2000 to examine the eﬀects of patent litigation on univer-
sity licensing eﬀorts. Siegel et al. (1999) examine the relationship between
licenses, TTO staﬀ and legal expenditures in their analysis of university
technology transfer. Feldman, Feller, Bercovitz and Burton (2002) ﬁnd an
increase in the use of cashed-in-equity in licensing agreements. Our analysis
adds depth by examining factors related to commercialization of inventions
in both established and start-up ﬁrms.
3 The Theoretical Model
The model is a reasonably straightforward compilation and extension of
those in Jensen and Thursby (2001) and Jensen, Thursby, and Thursby
5(2003). We model the problem as a multistage game with four players: the
TTO, the inventor, an established ﬁrm, and an investor/entrepreneur. The
game begins when the inventor discloses an invention to the TTO, who ﬁrst
decides either to shelve the invention (i.e., return it to the inventor), or
t os e a r c hf o ra ne s t a b l i s h e dﬁrm to which it oﬀers a license contract. If
ac o n t r a c ti so ﬀered, then the ﬁrm decides to accept or reject it. If the
ﬁrm rejects the contract, then the TTO shelves the invention. If the ﬁrm
accepts, it pays a ﬁxed license fee, M ≥ 0, and then a period of further
development follows. This development results in an updated probability
of success, which is common knowledge. The ﬁrm then decides whether to
terminate the project, in which case the TTO shelves the invention, or to
expend the additional resources necessary to attempt to commercialize it, in
which case all interested parties learn if the invention is a success or failure.
If it succeeds, the ﬁrm produces and pays total royalties of R ≥ 0. If it fails,
t h eg a m ee n d s .
If an established ﬁrm acquires a license, then both the inventor and
the licensee may expend further eﬀort eF and EF in development in or-
der to increase the probability of success. We assume these eﬀorts are not
contractible, but instead are chosen at the beginning of the development
period (after the licensing agreement has been made) as the equilibrium
outcomes e∗
F ≥ 0 and E∗
F ≥ 0 of a noncooperative subgame. These equi-






As is well-known by now, university inventions are typically embryonic.
Their commercial potential is uncertain, and the likelihood of their success
is very small. We assume that the probability of success p(eF,E F;Q,H)
depends not only on the development eﬀorts, but also on a measure of the
quality of the inventor, Q, and a measure of the historical success of the
TTO, H. We assume that p is increasing in the eﬀorts, inventor quality, and
past TTO success. It is evident that eﬀorts and inventor quality are inputs
in the “production” of a probability of success Including TTO success as
an input as well implies that, ceteris paribus, an invention drawn at random
from a faculty member at a university with a superior track record of success
is more likely to be a success. We also assume that p is jointly concave in
all its arguments, and that p ∈ (0,1) for all (e,E;Q,H). Finally, we assume
that additional eﬀort by the ﬁrm (in the form of more or better equipment,
for example) should increase the marginal impact of inventor eﬀort on the
probability of success,
∂2p
∂e∂E > 0. That is, inventor and ﬁrm eﬀorts are
“complements” in development, in the sense that they complement each
6other in the production of a positive probability of success.
If additional development occurs and the invention is a success, then
the ﬁrm chooses output to maximize its proﬁt( n e to fa n yl i c e n s ef e e s ) .
In general, because marginal production cost depends on the royalty rate,
the ﬁrm’s maximal output is decreasing in the royalty rate. Denote proﬁt-
maximizing output by x(r) where r ≥ 0 is the royalty rate per unit of
output. Assume that x(0) > 0 and x0(r) < 0, and that total royalty revenue
R = rx(r) is strictly concave in r and has a unique maximum at a positive,
ﬁnite value.1 Because the “eﬀort” provided by the ﬁrm can include materiel
and personnel as well as cash grants, denote the cost of its eﬀort by CF(EF),
which we assume is increasing at an increasing rate: CF(0) = 0, C0
F > 0,
and C00
F > 0. Finally, after development the ﬁrm must also pay a lump-sum
cost to attempt to commercialize the invention, KF > 0.T h u s ,i fΠ(x(r)) is
the ﬁrm’s maximized proﬁt (gross of royalty payments) for any royalty rate
r, then its expected payoﬀ from accepting a contract (RF,M F) is
PF(eF,E F)=p(eF,E F;Q,H)[Π(x(rF))−RF]−MF −CF(EF)−KF,( 1 )
where rF is the royalty rate associated with the contract (RF,M F) (i.e.,
RF = rFx(rF)).The ﬁrm accepts this contract and attempts to commercial-
ize the invention (after development) only if PF(eF,E F) ≥ 0.
Conversely, suppose that the TTO shelves the invention, which can oc-
cur after the inventor discloses or after a potential licensee rejects a contract
oﬀer.2 T h i sc o m m e r c i a l i z a t i o no ft h ei n v e n t i o no c c u r so n l yi fav e n t u r e
capitalist or angel investor can be found to provide the eﬀort required to
create a new, start-up ﬁrm based on the invention, as well as to assist in
additional development. TTOs typically expend little, if any, eﬀort in this
search process. The eﬀort expended by the inventor in this case typically in-
cludes both search for investors and additional development, and so exceeds
that when the licensee is an established ﬁrm. To economize on notation,
we let eS and ES denote the total eﬀorts expended by the inventor and the
venture capitalist or angel investor.
Nevertheless, if a start-up is created, then it is still the role of the TTO
to oﬀer a license contract for the use of the invention. We assume it takes
the same form, a combination of royalty and ﬁxed fee, (RS,M S), where the
1These assumptions on royalty revenue hold for a broad class of new process innovations
licensed to a single ﬁrm (including, but not limited to, the case of linear demand and
constant marginal cost).
2The ﬁrm could agree to a contract, and then refuse to attempt to commercialize it
after the development period if it is indiﬀerent, PL(RL,M L)=0 .I nt h i sc a s ew ea s s u m e
the ﬁrm attempts the commercialization.
7royalty rate is rS and total royalties are RS = rSx(rS). Again we assume
inventor and licensee eﬀorts eS and ES are the equilibrium outcomes of
a noncooperative subgame, and depend in general on the contract, e∗
S =
e∗
S(RS,M S) and E∗
S = E∗
S(RS,M S). The start-up ﬁrm’s cost of eﬀort is
CS(ES), which we again assume satisﬁes CS(0) = 0, C0
S > 0,a n dC00
S > 0.
If its lump-sum cost to attempt to commercialize the invention is KS > 0,
then its expected payoﬀ from accepting the contract (RS,M S) is
PS(eS,E S)=p(eS,E S;Q,H)[Π(x(rS)) − RS] − MS − CS(ES) − KS.( 2 )
The venture capitalist assists in the creation of a start-up ﬁrm, which ac-
cepts this contract and attempts to commercialize the invention (after de-
velopment), only if PS(eS,E S) ≥ 0.
Assume that, for each j = F,S, ˆ Ej is the maximum eﬀort that ﬁrm j
can devote to development. The continuity and strict concavity of each Pj
guarantees that it is maximized at some Ej ∈ [0, ˆ Ej], and so there exists
a ﬁrm j best-reply function bj(ej).M o r e o v e r ,
∂Pj(ej,0)
∂Ej > 0 >
∂PI(ej, ˆ Ej)
∂Ej
is suﬃcient to guarantee that Pj has an interior maximum at some Ej ∈






[Π(x(rj)) − Rj] − C0
j(Ej)=0 . (3)
It is worth noting that the ﬁrm expends eﬀort on additional development,
independently of the inventor, only if it can independently increase the prob-
ability of success.
The inventor’s utility function takes the form UI(YI,ϑ) − VI(e), where
YI is his income and ϑ is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a license is
sold and 0 if not. That is, the inventor gains utility both from income and
the prestige associated with the successful sale of a license (to any ﬁrm),3
but suﬀers disutility from eﬀort in further development, VI(e). Naturally
we assume positive but nonincreasing marginal utility from income (so the
inventor can be risk-neutral or risk-averse), positive marginal utility from
sale of a license, and positive and increasing marginal disutility of eﬀort:
∂UI
∂YI > 0 ≥ ∂2UI
∂Y 2
I
, UI(YI,1) >U I(YI,0), V 0
I > 0,a n dV 00
I > 0.T h u s ,i fαI is
his share of license income, then for each j = F,S, his expected utility is
PI(ej,E j)=p(ej,E j;Q,H)UI(αI(Mj + Rj),1) +
(1 − p(ej,E j;Q,H))UI(αIMj,1) − VI(ej). (4)
3See Stephan (1996) for a survey of empirical support for the assumption that inventors
also receive utility from nonpecuniary sources, such as seeing an invention licensesd or
patent granted.
8Now assume that ˆ e is the maximum eﬀort that the inventor can devote to
development. Then for each j = F,S, the continuity and strict concavity of
PI guarantees that it is maximized at some ej ∈ [0, ˆ e], and so there exists an
inventor best-reply function bI(Ej).M o r e o v e r ,
∂PI(0,Ej)
∂e > 0 >
∂PI(ˆ e,Ej)
∂e is
suﬃcient to guarantee that PI has an interior maximum at some ej ∈ (0, ˆ e),






[UI(αI(Mj + Rj),1) − UI(αIMj,1)] − V 0
I(ej)=0 .( 5 )
It is worth noting that, as in Jensen and Thursby (2001), the inventor ex-
pends eﬀort on additional development only if the royalty rate is positive.4
Theorem 1 Under the assumptions on the payoﬀ functions and strategies,
for each j = F,S and given contract (Rj,M j), there exists a Nash equi-
librium (e∗
j(Rj,M j),E∗
j(Rj,M j)) for the development subgame between the
ﬁrm and inventor. Furthermore, the equilibrium is:
(i) No development, e∗
j = E∗
j =0 ,i f
∂PI(0, ˆ Ej)
∂e < 0 and
∂Pj(ˆ e,0)
∂Ej < 0;
(ii) Both inventor and ﬁrm j expend eﬀort in development, e∗
j > 0 and
E∗
j > 0,i f
∂Pj(0,0)
∂Ej > 0 and
∂PI(0,0)
∂ej > 0;a n d




Proof. See the appendix.
Inventor and ﬁrm eﬀorts, whenever they are interior, are strategic com-




I(Ej) > 0 and b0
j(ej) > 0. As long as their best-reply functions
have the appropriate relative slopes, as depicted in ﬁgure 1, then there is a
unique and locally stable equilibrium in which development occurs and each
contributes to that development, e∗
j(Rj,M j) > 0 and E∗
j(Rj,M j) > 0 for
each j.
The TTO’s utility function is UT(YT,ϑ)−VTj(Q,H), where YT is income.
That is, the TTO also gains utility both from income and the prestige as-
sociated with the successful sale of a license, but suﬀers disutility from the
search for a licensee. Again we assume positive but nonincreasing marginal
utility from income, and positive marginal utility from sale of a license:
∂UT
∂YT > 0 ≥ ∂2UT
∂Y 2
T
and UT(YT,1) >U T(YT,0). We also assume that the
utility cost of search depends on the type of licensee, inventor quality, and
4If rj =0 ,t h e nej =0because he earns his share of the ﬁxed fee, αIM, whether he
expends any eﬀort or not, and the marginal disutility of eﬀort is positive, V
0
I(0) > 0.
9historical success of the TTO. In particular, the disutility of search is de-






∂H < 0,a n d
∂2VTj
∂H2 ≤ 0. We further assume, as
indicated above, that the disutility of search is smaller for a start-up ﬁrm:
VTF(Q,H) >V TS(Q,H) ≥ 0.T h e nf o rj = F,S, the TTO’s expected payoﬀ
from licensing with contract (Rj,M j) to ﬁrm j is
PT(Rj,M j)=p(e∗
j,E∗
j;Q,H)UT(αT(Mj + Rj),1) +
[1 − p(e∗
j,E∗
j;Q,H)]UT(αTMj,1) − VTj(Q,H),( 6 )
where αT ∈ (0,1) is its share of license income and αT + αI ≤ 1.5 If
the inventor ﬁnds a potential licensee, then the TTO’s problem for each
j = F,S is to choose a contract to maximize this expected payoﬀ subject to
the licensee’s participation constraint, or
max
(Rj,Mj)
PT(Rj,M j) s.t. Pj(e∗
j,E∗
j) ≥ 0.( 7 )
We denote these optimal choices by (R∗
j,M∗
j ). If a license contract with
positive royalty rate and ﬁxed fee is consummated, then the ﬁrst order con-











The condition in (8), of course, denotes a tangency between the expected-
payoﬀ indiﬀerence curves of the TTO and licensee in (Rj,M j)-space. An
e x a m p l eo ft h i si sd e p i c t e di nF i g u r e2 .
4 Empirical Implications
Our theory provides two types of empirical implications. First, it provides
predictions regarding factors that increase the likelihood of commercializa-
tion of university inventions via either established ﬁrms or start-ups.
Theorem 2 Licensing to either an established ﬁrm or a start-up ﬁrm is
more likely in the equilibrium of this dynamic licensing and development
game for inventors with higher quality and/or lower disutility from develop-
ment eﬀort, TTOs with greater historical success and/or lower disutility of
5This is generally less than 1 because the university administration also receives a share
of revenue.
10search for licensees, and inventions with lower costs of development and/or
commercialization for potential licensees.
Proof. Obvious.
Next, our theory provides predictions regarding factors that increase the
likelihood of commercialization of university inventions via start-ups. To
derive these implications, we consider those conditions necessary and suﬃ-
cient for commercialization in start-up ﬁrms rather than established ﬁrms.
Speciﬁcally, these are the conditions under which the unique equilibrium is
that the TTO sells a license to a start-up ﬁrm.
Theorem 3 L i c e n s i n gt oas t a r t - u pﬁrm, instead of an established ﬁrm, is
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Proof. This follows straightforwardly from the deﬁnition of the game
and the fact that the TTO and potential licensee payoﬀsi nt h e s es t a t e m e n t s
are evaluated at the equilibrium values of eﬀort that would prevail in the
development subgame if a license were executed.
We think of the game as unfolding as follows. The TTO, given a dis-
closure, ﬁrst considers licensing to an established ﬁrm. It determines the
solution to (7) for j = F,t h ec o n t r a c t(R∗
F,M∗
F), conditional on equilib-
rium behavior by the inventor and ﬁrm in the development subgame. The
TTO next considers shelving the invention, and providing minimal assis-
tance in searching for an investor in a start-up ﬁrm. This yields the contract
(R∗
S,M∗
S) that solves (7) for j = S, conditional on equilibrium behavior by
the inventor and ﬁrm in the development subgame. Licensing to this start-
up is the unique equilibrium, therefore, if either a contract can be sold to a
start-up but not an established ﬁr m ,o ri fac o n t r a c tc a nb es o l dt oe i t h e r
type of ﬁrm, but the TTO earns greater expected net utility the optimal
start-up contract. Thus, we emphasize that our model is consistent not only
with the observation that TTOs may turn to start-ups as a last resort, after
the eﬀort to ﬁnd an established ﬁrm has failed, but also with the observation
that TTOs may immediately shelve a disclosure and let the inventor pursue
as t a r t - u p .
11If the TTO’s disutility of searching were the same for both types of
licensee, then a license is sold to a start-up only if has greater (positive)
expected proﬁt, gross of license payments, so that the TTO’s net utility
from licensing to that start-up is greater. Although this may seem unlikely,
ap r i o r i , it is not. Indeed, three types of eﬃciency can contribute to greater
expected proﬁtf o ras t a r t - u p .
First, expected proﬁt depends on the ﬁrm’s cost of development eﬀort
and the cost of attempting to commercialize the invention. The opportunity
costs of development and commercialization can be greater for established
ﬁrms, which typically have alternatives that are more closely related to their
current product line, and so more proﬁtable. Conversely, venture capitalists
routinely deal with inventions that do not ﬁt well in existing product lines,
so they may well have cost advantages from better access to and informa-
tion about the technological expertise needed to develop and commercialize
embryonic inventions. Similarly, start-ups may well have cost advantages
due to the inventor’s superior knowledge of the technology, which can limit
transactional and informational problems.
Second, expected proﬁt also depends upon the post-development proba-
bility of success. An inventor often has a closer relationship with a start-up,
and may provide greater development eﬀort as a result. A venture capitalist
a l s om a yp r o v i d em o r ee ﬀort (resources) than an established ﬁrm. Because
inventor and ﬁrm eﬀorts are strategic complements, greater eﬀort by either
induces greater eﬀort by the other, thus further increasing the probability of
success and expected proﬁt. The equilibrium of the development subgame,
therefore, may involve greater inventor and/or ﬁrm eﬀort, and greater ex-
pected proﬁt, for start-up.
Third, licensing to a start-up ﬁrm can occur, even if expected proﬁt
is greater for an established ﬁrm, because the TTO’s opportunity cost of
searching for an established ﬁrm as a licensee is greater. This is an assump-
tion of our model, of course, but it is consistent with the stylized facts. TTOs
tend to focus their limited time on ﬁnding established ﬁrms as licensees for
their most promising inventions, while essentially ignoring the others, which
then typically are commercialized only if the inventors make the lion’s share
of the eﬀort to ﬁnd investors to assist them in forming start-ups. This may
well be a more eﬃcient approach for such inventions, because the inventors
have a better understanding of their embryonic nature, and so should be
better able to ﬁnd potential partners than the TTO.
We summarize the implications of the theory for our empirical analysis
in terms of characteristics of the inventor, the invention, the TTO, and
ﬁnancial markets. This approach is arbitrary, but facilitates the discussion.
12The primary characteristic of an inventor is his (perceived) quality. Higher
quality inventors disclose inventions which, ceteris paribus, have higher prob-
abilities of success and lower TTO utility costs of searching, and thus are
more likely to be licensed to either established ﬁrms or start-ups.
T h en a t u r eo ft h ei n v e n t i o ni sa l s oi m p o r t a n t ,i nt h es e n s et h a ti n v e n t i o n s
which result from more applied research are “closer” to commercialization.
Such inventions would not only have higher probabilities of success for given
levels of eﬀort, but also lower search costs for the TTO, and thus are more
likely to be licensed to established ﬁrms than start-ups.
TTOs are also an important factor in the commercialization of university
inventions. They rely on their experience and expertise in their search for
ﬁrms to serve as partners in commercializing inventions. Those with more
experience and expertise, and with more past success, should be more likely
to sell licenses to either established ﬁrms or start-ups. TTOs also play a role
as intermediaries between inventors and licensees, and as such may serve as
guarantors of minimum quality levels (see Hoppe and Ozdenoren 2004 and
Macho-Stadler, Perez-Castrillo, and Veugelers 2004). From this perspective,
we expect relatively more licenses to established ﬁrms and fewer start-ups
from more experienced and successful TTOs.
Finally, our theory predicts that ﬁnancial market conditions, and the
availability of capital and credit, should be an important factor in deter-
mining whether licensing occurs to start-ups or established ﬁrms. These
conditions inﬂuence the costs of developing and attempting to commercial-
ize the invention, as well as the TTO’s cost of searching for a licensee and the
probability that the invention will eventually succeed. Venture capitalists
play a signiﬁcant and unique role in start-up activity and innovation.6 Li-
censing to start-ups, but not established ﬁrms, should be positively related
to the general ability of the inventor or TTO to tap into venture capital
funding. Similarly, we expect a positive relationship between start-up ac-
tivity and returns to the S&P 500 because more start-up activity occurs, in
general, when business conditions are favorable. However, we expect both
the rate of return to venture capital and the interest rate to be negatively
related to start-up activity, because higher rates indicate greater opportu-
nity costs of development and commercialization of university start-ups for
venture capitalists, who have other, more proﬁtable opportunities.
6Kortum and Lerner (2000) ﬁnd that venture capital fund-raising positively eﬀects
patenting rates.
135 Data and Methodology
Data on commercialization of university inventions via start-ups and licenses
to established ﬁrms were gathered from the AUTM surveys for ﬁscal years
1993 through 2002. The sample is an unbalanced panel of 110 universities,
including 40 private universities, 67 universities with medical schools, and
31 universities in the ﬁve states that received the largest venture capital
investments. To be precise, our data for “start-ups” are companies formed
with the aid of the university technology licensing oﬃce in order to commer-
cialize a faculty invention. The AUTM Licensing Survey 2002 states that
start-up ﬁrms “are companies that were dependent upon licensing the insti-
tution’s technology for initiation.”7 Our data for “licenses” are those license
and option agreements executed with established ﬁrms. The universities in
our sample generated 3,047 start-ups, 79,579 disclosures and 24,352 licenses
during this time period. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the all
variables we consider in this sample. The average number of start-ups per
university is 3.2 per year, and the average number of licenses is 25.6 per year.
Technology transfer oﬃces received 83.2 new invention disclosures per year,
and had an average of 3.3 full time employees devoted to licensing activity.
We test our theoretical model using two equations of the form,
Yit = αit + β1X1i + β2X2it + β3X3it + β4X4it + eit.( 9 )
In model 1, the dependent variable is start-ups at university i in year t,
and in model 2, the dependent variable is licenses at university i in year t.
The independent variables include our proxy measures of inventor quality,
X1i,TTO characteristics, X2it, invention characteristics, X3it and ﬁnancial
market conditions (including venture capital), X4it. Because the indepen-
dent variables involve count data, and there are many zeros in the start-up
data, our benchmark models 1 and 2 estimate (9) using a negative binomial
model.
Because our theory predicts that licensing to start-ups or established
ﬁrms is positively related to faculty quality, for each university i,w eu s e
three measures of inventor quality, X1it: quality of the graduate faculty,
QUALi; quality of the engineering faculty, ENGQUALi; and quality of the
natural sciences faculty, SCIQUALi. Previous studies have used the data
from the 1993 National Research Council’s Survey of Ph.D. Granting In-
stitutions (NRC 1995) to construct a quality measure for each university
by computing the weighted average of the NRC scores for each department
7Association of University Technology Managers Survey FY 2002, page 24.
14(where the weights are determined by faculty size). This measure is ﬂawed
because it omits faculty without doctoral programs. More importantly, from
our perspective, it is also too coarse a measure because it includes faculty in
the humanities and social sciences, who are not typically the driving forces
behind university licensing and start-up activity. Because most inventions
come from faculty in engineering and natural sciences, we also control for
quality in these disciplines. For each university, we also construct a weighted
average of the NRC quality scores for its engineering departments, and a
weighted average of the NRC quality scores for its natural science depart-
ments.8 The NRC rankings for each department in this survey ranged from
0 to 5, where 5 indicates a distinguished department, so higher values of
QUALi correspond to higher quality of the graduate faculty, higher values
of ENGQUALi correspond to higher quality of the engineering faculty, and
higher values of SCIQUALi correspond to higher of the natural sciences
faculty. Our theory predicts a positive relationship between any measure of
inventor quality and both start-ups and licenses to established ﬁrms.
W ea l s ou s ead u m m yv a r i a b l et od e n o t ew h e t h e rt h eu n i v e r s i t yi sp r i v a t e
or public (PRIVATEi =1if private, 0 otherwise). Private universities may,
in general, have higher quality faculty, in which case this dummy variable
would be just another proxy for quality. Similarly, private schools may have
more ﬂexibility in research options, which would imply more licensing to
start-ups and established ﬁrms. However, private universities may also have
more or better ties to established ﬁrms, which would leads us to expect fewer
licenses to start-ups than established ﬁrms.
Because our theory predicts that licensing to start-ups or established
ﬁrms depends positively on the TTO’s historical success, we also include
measures of TTO characteristics as independent variables, X2it.F o r e a c h
university i, in each year t, we use the number of disclosures, DISit,t h e
age of the technology transfer oﬃce, TTOAGEit, the size of the technology
transfer oﬃce, TTOSIZEit,and the log of gross royalties, LNGROSSit,a s
proxies for TTO success. TTOs who have elicited more disclosures from
their faculty are likely to sell more licenses simply because they have more
new inventions in their portfolio. Similarly, TTOs that are older and larger
have not only more resources, but also more experience and expertise in
evaluating disclosures and in searching for licensees. TTOs with greater
gross royalties have more past success, both in selecting disclosures to pursue
and in ﬁnding licensees for them.
Next, we include two variables as proxies for the characteristics of the
8We thank Jerry Thursby for providing his NRC data.
15inventions, in terms of their commercial orientation, X3it.W eu s ead u m m y
variable to measure the presence of a medical school (MEDi =1if medical
school, 0 otherwise). The presence of a medical school suggests the univer-
sity may produce a higher proportion of inventions that are applied, in the
sense that their commercial potential is more obvious. We also include the
ratio of industrial research support to federal research support, INDFEDit,
as an invention characteristic. Universities with greater relative industrial
funding may also tend to produce a higher proportion of inventions that are
applied in nature, and so more apparently suitable for commercialization.
Such inventions should be characterized, ceteris paribus, by both higher
probabilities of success and lower TTO cost of search for established ﬁrms
as licensees. Thus we expect that the presence of a medical school and high
level of relative industrial funding to be positively related to licensing to
established ﬁrms, but negatively be related to start-up activity.
Finally, because our model predicts that university licensing should be
related market conditions and availability of capital and credit, we include
several measures of ﬁnancial market and general business conditions, X4it,
as independent variables for the case of start-ups, model 1. First, we use
two proxies to measure the TTO’s general ability to tap into venture cap-
ital funding. These data are obtained from the National Venture Capital
Association Yearbook 2004. First, we use the log of venture capital funding
in each state for each university i in that state for each ﬁscal year t from
1993 through 2002, VCSTA TE it. We also use a dummy variable to de-
note whether the university is located in one of the six states that received
the most venture capital funding9 (HIGHVCSTit =1if located in a high
venture capital state, 0 otherwise). We use state level data because direct
data for the universities in our sample is hard to obtain due to legal issues.
As noted above, our theory predicts a positive relationship between venture
capital spending and licensing to start-ups.
Next, for each year t in the sample, we include the ﬁve year rolling aver-
ages of the Venture Capital Index, RLAV EV Ct and the Standard and Poors
500 Index RLAV ESPt, and the annual percentage change in the Federal Re-
serve’s fed funds rate, INTERESTt.10 We expect both the average venture
capital index and the interest rate to be negatively related to start-up activ-
ity, as they proxy the opportunity costs of university start-ups for venture
capitalists. However, we expect a positive relationship between start-up ac-
9California, New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maryland, and Texas.
10Interest rate data is compiled from the St. Louis Federal Reserve Database (FREDII)
and the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
16tivity and returns to the S&P 500, because more start-up activity occurs,
in general, when business conditions are favorable.
Finally, we do not include these proxies for venture capital activity and
market sentiment in our analysis of licensing to established ﬁrms, model 2,
because it seems much more likely that these variables play a signiﬁcant role
in licensing decisions by established ﬁrms. Our robustness checks in Section
7c o n ﬁrm this.
6 Empirical Results
The results for our benchmark estimations using the negative binomial
model are presented in Table 2. Results for other speciﬁcations used as
robustness checks are in Tables 3-7.
In general, our results provide strong evidence that inventor quality is
positively related to licensing to both start-ups and established ﬁrms. The
estimated coeﬃcients for our engineering and science quality variables are
positive in our benchmark regression estimations both for licensing to start-
ups (model 1) and licensing to established ﬁrms (model 2). The coeﬃcients
for engineering quality are positive and signiﬁcant, but the coeﬃcients for
science quality are not. These ﬁndings support our theoretical result that
inventions from high-quality faculty are more easily commercialized with
either established or start-up ﬁr m s .T h e s er e s u l t sa r es i m i l a rt ot h eD iG r e -
goriao and Shane (2003) ﬁnding of a positive relationship between start-up
formation and faculty quality, as measured by the Gourman Report, for
the period 1994-1998. They are also consistent with the Shane and Stuart
(2002) ﬁnding that intellectual eminence is positively related to start-up ac-
tivity. Moreover, these results are also consistent with the ﬁnding of Jensen,
Thursby and Thursby (2003) that higher quality faculty disclose inventions
at earlier stages of development, the ﬁndings of Lach and Shankerman (2002)
that higher quality faculty disclose more inventions and higher value inven-
tions, and the ﬁnding of Thursby and Thursby (1998) that faculty are critical
in the licensing process. Our results contribute to this literature by eval-
uating faculty quality and start-up activity in the context of licensing, in
general.
We contribute to this literature by using these more precise measures
of quality. We also analyzed the data using the original, over-all quality
measure from the NRC data that includes all departments. The estimated
coeﬃcients for over-all quality are positive in our benchmark regressions both
for licensing to start-ups (model 3) and established ﬁrms (model 4). How-
17ever, the coeﬃcients for science quality and engineering quality, when added
together, are larger than the coeﬃcient for the over-all quality measure. We
checked this result using several estimation techniques as robustness checks
and found similar results (see Tables 3-5 and 7). Thus, our more detailed
measures for faculty quality have more explanatory power. Interestingly,
these results also suggest that it is the quality of engineering faculty that
is most important to commercialization of university inventions via either
start-ups or established ﬁrms.
We ﬁnd no evidence that our dummy variable for the whether the uni-
versity is private helped to predict license to start-ups or established ﬁrms.
For either dependent variable, the estimated coeﬃcient for this indicator
variable is negative, but not signiﬁcant. We believe this may indicate that
whether a university is private may simply be a proxy for the quality of
potential inventors at that university.
As predicted by our theory, the number of invention disclosures to the
TTO is positively and signiﬁcantly related to licensing to both start-ups
and established ﬁrms. In our benchmark regressions, and in virtually all of
our other model speciﬁcations, the estimated coeﬃcients for disclosures are
positive and signiﬁcant. Universities with larger pools of disclosures execute
more licenses to both established ﬁrms and start-ups Although a larger pool
of disclosures may increase the TTO’s opportunity cost of searching for a
licensee for any one of them, it also increases the number of commercially vi-
able disclosures and thereby generally results in more licensing. This reﬂects
the now well-known fact that university technology transfer relies essentially
on the solicitation of disclosures from faculty.
The estimated coeﬃcients for the log of gross licensing royalties are pos-
itive and signiﬁcant for licenses to established ﬁrms. The coeﬃcient are
positive for start-ups also, but signiﬁcant only when the single over-all mea-
sure of quality is used (Models 3 and 4). These results are reasonably robust,
holding for the majority of alternative speciﬁcations. Our theory predicts
that larger gross licensing royalties, as a measure of greater past TTO suc-
cess, should increase all licensing. Apparently, those universities that are
able to generate many start-ups may not be the same universities that also
have large royalty incomes. This is consistent with the stylized fact that the
majority of “royalty rich” TTOs obtain their revenue from established ﬁrms,
and view start-ups as a last resort.
We also ﬁnd evidence that the age of the TTO positively aﬀects all licens-
ing. The estimated coeﬃcient is positive and signiﬁcant in the benchmark
models. As predicted by our theory, older and more experienced TTOs are
more likely to license inventions to both start-ups and established ﬁrms.
18This result is robust for license to established ﬁrm in all alternatives, and
for licenses to start-ups in the majority. This is consistent with the results
of Lach and Schankerman (2002), who ﬁnd that disclosures and their aver-
age values increase with TTO age, and with the results of Franklin, Wright,
and Lockett (2001), who ﬁnd that older universities are more successful in
launching new startups. Feldman Feller, Bercovitz and Burton (2002) simi-
larly ﬁnd that the greater the amount of experience with technology transfer,
the more likely the university will accept equity-based technology transfer
mechanisms. Older, experienced TTOs are more eﬀective in commercializ-
ing inventions, in general. Thus, although increases in TTO age increase
both the probability of success of a given disclosure and the cost of TTO
search for an established ﬁrm as a partner in our theory, it appears that the
former eﬀect outweighs the latter in this data.
It is somewhat surprising that the size of the TTO did not have a signif-
icant impact on start-up activity. This coeﬃcient was very small in general,
and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in the benchmark case. Interest-
ingly, this is one result that was not very robust, as TTO size did have
as i g n i ﬁcant impact on licensing to start-ups and established ﬁrms in sev-
eral other speciﬁcations. However, these other results were not consistent
in that the signiﬁcant signs often took opposite signs in alternative spec-
iﬁc a t i o n s( s e eT a b l e s3 - 7 ) . T h i ss u g g e s t st h a tT T Os i z en e e dn o th a v ea
signiﬁcant or consistent eﬀect on licensing.
The presence of a medical school also did not seem to signiﬁcantly af-
fect licensing to either start-ups or established ﬁrms. The coeﬃcient for
medical schools is negative but not signiﬁcant for licenses to start-ups, but
is positive, and still not signiﬁcant, for licences to established ﬁrms. This
may indicate that universities with medical schools generate less start-up
activity, and support our theory that inventors from medical schools may
be more commercially oriented, so it is easier to license their inventions to
established ﬁrms. It is also consistent with the ﬁnding of Jensen, Thursby
and Thursby (2003) that universities with higher fractions of their inven-
tions from medical schools have more inventions disclosed at an early stage
of development.
The coeﬃcient for the ratio of industrial to federal research support is
positive and signiﬁcant for licenses to both start-ups and established ﬁrms.
This result was reasonably robust, in that the sign was positive in all speciﬁ-
cations, but not always signiﬁcant. This is perhaps not surprising as Jensen,
Thursby and Thursby (2003) ﬁnd this variable does not help to predict the
stage of development at which inventions are disclosed. Following Di Grego-
riao and Shane (2003), we also used the ratio of industrial support to total
19research support in an attempt to capture the applied nature of research,
but found no signiﬁcance with this variable either.
Our results provide evidence that access to venture capital aﬀects start-
up activity. The estimated coeﬃcient for the log of venture capital funding
in the state where the university is located is positive, but not signiﬁcant.
Similarly, the estimated coeﬃcient for whether the university is located in
one of the six states with the most venture capital funding is usually positive,
but not signiﬁcant. Given our theory, we anticipated positive, signiﬁcant
results. Apparently these proxies for the local availability of venture capital
are too broadly deﬁned to capture the expected eﬀect.
Nevertheless, we do ﬁnd evidence that the ﬁve year rolling average of
returns to venture capital signiﬁcantly, and negatively, impacts licensing to
start-ups. This result is robust to all speciﬁcations. When the rate of return
to venture capital is high, venture capitalists have many opportunities that
are more lucrative than start-ups based on university inventions, and they
obvious pursue these. Alternatively stated, given the embryonic nature of
university inventions, the evidence suggests that venture capitalists turn to
university start-ups as a last resort.
Finally, we ﬁnd evidence that interest rate changes signiﬁcantly impact
start-up activity. The estimated coeﬃcient for interest rate percentage
change is negative and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in each regression
speciﬁcation. As interest rates rise, available capital for start-up formation
decreases. We also ﬁn de v i d e n c et h a tt h er a t eo fg r o w t hi nt h eS & P5 0 0
index is positively and signiﬁcantly related to start-up activity. Increases in
the S&P 500 reﬂect improvements in overall business sentiment, which leads
to more university start-up activity. These result lend support to our view
that indicators of economics activity and market sentiment positively aﬀect
start-up activity.
7 Robustness Checks
We checked our results using several tests for robustness. First, given con-
cerns about possible endogeneity of some of the TTO characteristics, we also
estimated our benchmark model using both lagged disclosures and lagged
cumulative disclosures, and the lagged log of gross royalties. Our results
r e m a i n e dt h es a m ei nt h e s es p e c i ﬁcations. Also, to check whether ﬁnancial
market variables mattered only for licenses to start-ups, we also estimated
our benchmark model for licenses to established ﬁrms including ﬁnancial
market variables, and none of these coeﬃcients was signiﬁcant.
20Because we began the analysis, as usual, by examining a simple OLS
speciﬁcation, we also decided to check whether contemporaneous cross-
equation error correlation existed. It is possible that our benchmark model
1 and model 2 are related through the correlation in the error terms. In
Table 7, we show results from the estimation of three seeming unrelated
regressions. We found no correlation in error terms. Estimating these two
equations separately seems to lend greater explanatory power.
We also empirically tested our theoretical model using random eﬀects
models to account for any unobserved inter-university diﬀerences or clus-
tering eﬀects that may exist. This design allows for additional sources of
variation in the model to examine variance of error terms across universi-
ties for contemporaneous correlation between cross-sections. We estimated
am o d e lu s i n gar a n d o me ﬀects speciﬁcation that allowed for in-state depen-
dence between universities but assumed no dependence between universities
across states. These results in Table 5 were largely similar to those in Table
2, our benchmark model and the standard errors were very similar. It does
not appear that university inter-dependence or cross-sectional eﬀects signiﬁ-
cantly impact our ﬁndings. Thus, we found no need to conduct cross-section
weighted estimations.
Finally, we also tested our theory using ﬁxed-eﬀects models. We check
for any unmodeled heterogeneity and assume that individual speciﬁct i m e
invariant eﬀects may exist (see Table 6). We added a time trend to fur-
ther examine the positive relationship between our proxies for cost, ven-
ture capital spending and start-up ﬁrm activity and licensing to established
ﬁrms. This model excludes our quality measures and indicator variables for
whether the university has a medical school or is public or private. These
results are also still very similar to those in Table 2, our benchmark model.
8C o n c l u s i o n
We have developed and empirically tested a theoretical model to explain why
commercialization of university research occurs in start-up ﬁrms rather than
established ﬁrms. Several empirical implications follow immediately from
the theory. Essentially, we are more likely to observe commercialization of
university inventions by start-up ﬁrms in situations in which start-ups are
more likely to have a cost advantage in the development or commercialization
of the invention, or in which the opportunity cost of TTOs in searching for
an established ﬁrm as a partner is higher.
We tested the implications of the model in terms of characteristics of the
21inventor, the invention, and the TTO, and ﬁnancial market conditions. We
estimated negative binomial, Poisson, ordinary least squares, ﬁxed eﬀects
and random eﬀects models using the annual number of licenses to start-ups
and licenses to established ﬁrms per university. Our results provide evidence
that inventor quality, especially in engineering departments, has a positive
impact on licensing in general. We also ﬁnd that measures of TTO success,
such as disclosures, the age of the TTO, and gross royalties, have a positive
impact on licensing in general. Financial market variables also matter, as we
ﬁnd that both the rate of return to venture capital and the interest rate have
negative and signiﬁcant eﬀects on the number of university start-ups, but
the S&P 500 has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on start-ups. Our analysis
therefore indicates that university inventions are so embryonic that, if an
established ﬁrm is unwilling to take a license, then it is very diﬃcult to fund
a start-up because even venture capitalists come to university inventions
only as a last resort.
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1 0 A p p e n d i x :P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 .
Existence of at least one Nash equilibrium follows immediately from the fact
that the payoﬀs are continuous and deﬁned on compact strategy spaces. As
n o t e di nt h et e x t ,f o re a c hj = F,S, the continuity and strict concavity of
PI guarantees that it is maximized at some ej ∈ [0, ˆ e], and so there exists an
inventor best-reply function bI(Ej).I f
∂PI(0, ˆ Ej)
∂ej ≤ 0,t h e n
∂2p
∂e∂E > 0 implies
∂PI(0,Ej)
∂ej < 0 for all Ej ∈ [0, ˆ Ej),s oPI has its maximum at ej =0 ,a n d
bI(Ej)=0for all Ej ∈ [0, ˆ Ej]. Similarly, the continuity and strict concavity
24of each Pj guarantees that it is maximized at some Ej ∈ [0, ˆ Ej],a n ds ot h e r e
exists a ﬁrm j best-reply function bj(ej).I f
∂Pj(ˆ e,0)





∂Ej < 0 for all ej ∈ [0, ˆ e),s oPj has its maximum at Ej =0 ,
and bj(ej)=0for all ej ∈ [0,ˆ e]. This proves statement (i). Conversely, if
∂Pj(0,0)
∂Ej > 0,t h e n
∂2p
∂e∂E > 0 implies
∂Pj(ej,0)
∂Ej > 0,a n ds obj(ej) > 0, for all
ej > 0;a n di f
∂PI(0,0)
∂ej > 0,t h e n
∂2p
∂e∂E > 0 implies
∂PI(0,Ej)
∂ej > 0,a n ds o
bI(ej) > 0, for all Ej > 0. This proves statement (ii). Statement (iii) then
follows from the deﬁnition of uniqueness and locally stability. Q.E.D.
25Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Start-up Companies Formed 951 3.203996 5.624048 0 64
Licenses and Options Executed 951 25.60673 35.73951 0 313
Inventor Characteristics
NRC overall Quality Engineering Ranking weighted by department 830 2.867632 0.817586 1.24 4.631456
NRC overall Quality Sciences Ranking weighted by department 1080 2.974425 0.832695 0.717059 4.746132
NRC overall Quality Ranking weighted by department 1100 2.923386 0.798214 1.203704 4.697401
University is private (yes = 1) 1100 0.355455 0.478869 0 1
TTO Characteristics
Licensing FTE's in Technology Transfer Offices 951 3.259474 5.026659 0 62
TTO Age - Program Year Technology Transfer Office Began  971 14.19773 12.27503 0 77
Invention Disclosures Received 956 83.24163 100.1542 0 973
Log of Gross License Income Received 950 13.88279 1.977126 6.60665 19.40562
Invention Characteristics
University has Medical School (yes = 1) 1100 0.592727 0.49155 0 1
Industrial/Federal Research Expenditure 951 0.176505 0.182519 0 1.610801
Financial/Market Conditions
Interest Rate Level 1100 2.073583 1.246248 0.0225 3.753333
Log of Venture Capital Expenditure per State 1100 18.87763 2.964445 0 24.4911
University is located in a High Venture Capital Expenditure State (yes = 1) 1100 0.273636 0.446027 0 1
Returns to Venture Capital 1100 27.78 12.47522 11.2 48.6
Returns to the S & P 500 index 1100 13.06 7.591099 -1.9 26.2Table 2. Negative Binomial Regressions Predicting the Effect of Inventor Quality, TTO Experience and Financial 
Market Conditions on Start-up Activity and Licensing to Established Firms
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4








PRIVATE -0.11 -0.182 -0.155 -0.11
(0.138) (0.117) (0.124) (0.106)
TTO Characteristics
TTOSIZE 0.003 -0.003 0.001 -0.004
(0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004)
TTOAGE 0.009 0.014 0.009 0.012
(0.004)* (0.004)** (0.004)* (0.004)**
DIS 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.001)** (0.000)** (0.001)** (0.000)**
LNGROSS 0.058 0.122 0.076 0.136
(0.035) (0.022)** (0.030)* (0.018)**
Invention Characteristics
MED 0.171 0.135 -0.12 -0.045
(0.121) (0.11) (0.107) (0.097)
INDFED 0.731 0.485 0.463 0.37












Constant -1.927 -1.918 -2.076 -1.722
(0.544)** (0.359)** (0.501)** (0.291)**
Observations 655 659 845 847
Log likelihood -1344.2918 -2355.8865 -1675.3458-2942.4997
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%Table 3. Poisson Regressions Predicting the Effect of Inventor Quality, TTO Experience and Financial Market 
Conditions on Start-up Activity and Licensing to Established Firms
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4








PRIVATE -0.091 -0.452 -0.048 -0.413
(0.138) (0.158)** (0.134) (0.132)**
TTO Characteristics
TTOSIZE 0.001 -0.009 0.005 -0.01
(0.007) (0.002)** (0.007) (0.002)**
TTOAGE 0.008 0.062 0.01 0.054
(0.005) (0.004)** (0.005)* (0.003)**
DIS 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)**
LNGROSS 0.046 0.052 0.072 0.088
(0.035) (0.013)** (0.027)** (0.011)**
Invention Characteristics
MED 0.192 0.091 -0.107 -0.04
(0.124) (0.161) (0.117) (0.128)
INDFED 0.823 0.583 0.526 0.466












Constant -1.995 -1.417 -2.25 -1.45
(0.462)** (0.371)** (0.429)** (0.284)**
Observations 655 659 845 847
Log likelihood -1431.0948 -2821.9427 -1809.517 -3470.515
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%Table 4 OLS Regressions Predicting the Effect of Inventor Quality, TTO Experience and Financial Market 
Conditions on Start-up Activity and Licensing to Established Firms
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4








PRIVATE 0.111 -2.831 0.126 -3.46
(0.464) (2.245) (0.392) (1.783)
TTO Characteristics
TTOSIZE -0.054 2.454 0.042 2.031
(0.058) (0.307)** (0.014)** (0.261)**
TTOAGE 0.044 0.767 -0.036 0.718
(0.014)** (0.076)** (0.054) (0.067)**
DIS 0.025 0.08 0.024 0.114
(0.003)** (0.018)** (0.003)** (0.015)**
LNGROSS -0.03 1.474 0.042 1.629
(0.136) (0.708)* (0.108) (0.518)**
Invention Characteristics
MED -0.314 0.93 -0.813 -2.782
(0.405) (2.096) (0.338)* (1.637)
INDFED 2.191 3.899 1.353 0.171












Constant 0.478 -48.271 0.252 -38.293
(1.898) (8.862)** (1.59) (6.674)**
Observations 655 659 845 847
R-squared 0.46 0.67 0.4191 0.67
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%Table 5. Random Effects Regressions Predicting the Effect of Inventor Quality, TTO Experience and Financial 
Market Conditions on Start-up Activity and Licensing to Established Firms
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4








PRIVATE 0.215 -4.287 0.174 -4.374
(0.637) (4.46) (0.48) (3.568)
TTO Characteristics
TTOSIZE 0.015 0.334 0.013 0.224
(0.068) (0.34) (0.06) (0.29)
TTOAGE 0.047 0.763 0.044 0.731
(0.020)* (0.144)** (0.017)** (0.124)**
DIS 0.021 0.183 0.022 0.189
(0.004)** (0.020)** (0.003)** (0.017)**
LNGROSS -0.049 1.016 0.028 1.011
(0.166) (0.855) (0.123) (0.624)
Invention Characteristics
MED -0.262 1.553 -0.802 -0.726
(0.552) (4.214) (0.411) (3.276)
INDFED 1.913 8.571 1.14 6.721












Constant 0.183 -38.883 0.316 -31.691
(2.268) (12.558)** (1.769) (9.327)**
sigma_u    1.506104 15.64351 1.1167678 14.251912
sigma_e 4.036787 16.05907 4.0828955 14.671985
rho 0.122191 0.486894 0.0696074 0.4854797
R-sq: within 0.2218 0.2468 0.1969 0.247
R-sq: between 0.723 0.7354 0.7052 0.7411
R-sq: overall 0.4536 0.641 0.4184 0.6467
Observations 655 659 845 847
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%Table 6. Fixed Effects Regressions Predicting the Effect of TTO Experience and Financial Market Conditions on 
Start-up Activity and Licensing to Established Firms
Model 1. Model 2

























sigma_u    3.194713 19.47604
sigma_e 4.089992 14.69187
rho 0.37893 0.637327
R-sq: within 0.2058 0.253
Observations 845 847
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%Table 7. Seemingly Unrelated Regressions Predicting the Effect of Inventor Quality, TTO Experience and 
Financial Market Conditions on Start-up Activity and Licensing to Established Firms
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Dependent Variable Start-ups Licenses Start-ups Licenses Start-ups Licenses
Inventor Characteristics
ENGQUAL 1.018 9.507 0.985 8.627
(0.472)* (2.506)** (0.471)* (2.498)**
SCIQUAL 0.088 1.036 0.107 0.898
(0.491) (2.609) (0.491) (2.605)
QUAL 9.145 0.987
(1.818)** (0.340)**
PRIVATE 0.111 -1.157 0.113 -0.964 0.112 -2.629
(0.458) (2.436) (0.458) (2.421) (0.453) (2.234)
TTO Characteristics
TTOSIZE -0.054 2.542 -0.055 2.441 -0.064 2.454
(0.058) (0.306)** (0.058) (0.307)** (0.057) (0.304)**
TTOAGE 0.044 0.762 0.044 0.738 0.042 0.771
(0.014)** (0.076)** (0.014)** (0.076)** (0.014)** (0.075)**
DIS 0.025 0.081 0.025 0.093 0.026 0.08
(0.003)** (0.018)** (0.003)** (0.018)** (0.003)** (0.018)**
LNGROSS -0.03 1.174 -0.028 1.439 -0.004 1.458
(0.135) (0.717) (0.135) (0.702)* (0.131) (0.707)*
Invention Characteristics
MED -0.314 1.085 -0.323 -2.384 -0.685 0.755
(0.4) (2.127) (0.4) (2.018) (0.378) (2.085)
INDFED 2.191 3.247 2.182 0.268 1.901 3.836
(1.052)* (5.588) (1.052)* (5.526) (1.035) (5.539)
Financial/Market Conditions
INTEREST -2.465 1.296 -2.466 1.222 -2.48
(0.216)** (1.146) (0.216)** (1.154) (0.216)**
LNVCSTAT 0.011 -0.406 0.011 -0.241 0.03
(0.073) (0.39) (0.073) (0.39) (0.073)
HIGHVCST 0.26 -2.922 0.26 -3.617 0.199
(0.532) (2.828) (0.532) (2.857) (0.535)
RLAVEVC -0.085 0.149 -0.085 0.126 -0.088
(0.017)** (0.093) (0.017)** (0.093) (0.017)**
RLAVESP 0.343 0.04 0.044 0.343
(0.039)** (0.206) (0.039)** (0.207) (0.039)**
Constant 0.478 -46.355 -46.912 0.387 -47.382
(1.876) (9.966)** (1.876) (10.087)** (1.888) (8.861)**
Observations 655 655 655 655 655 655
R-squared 0.4551 0.6742 0.4551 0.6693
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Breusch-Pagan test of 
independence: chi2(1) =      0.682, Pr = 0.4091 0.594, Pr = 0.4411     0.648, Pr = 0.4209